guilty criminals to escape conviction on procedural technicalities. For others, it is an indispensable substantive component of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unnecessary search and seizure. Set against the backdrop of this historic conflict, Leon can be seen as a great achievement, one that has freed courts from "a difficult dilemma.", 5 Yet significant abdications of appellate responsibility. At times, the refusal to rule on the underlying probable cause issues in such cases even creates tension with the guiding principles for appellate review of the exclusionary rule set forth by Leon itself.
12
When there is a genuine dispute about whether law enforcement officers could have reasonably relied in good faith upon the judge's decision to issue a search warrant, Koerth provides a clear outline for orderly appellate review of exclusionary rule cases. Koerth's "substantial basis" test requires appellate courts to review probable cause issues before turning to questions about the good faith reliance of law enforcement officers on the search warrant. Koerth charges appellate courts to continue to accord deference to the warrant-issuing judge's initial determination of probable cause, so long as there is a "substantial basis" in the factual record to support the issuing judge's decision.1
3 If an appellate court finds that this substantial basis was present, "then it follows that the officer's actions were reasonable," and the evidence uncovered in the challenged search should be admitted.
If the appellate court finds that a substantial basis for the issuing judge's probable cause determination was lacking, Koerth directs the appellate court to turn to the issue of good faith reliance of law enforcement officers upon the search warrant. At this stage, appellate courts simply reapply the familiar Leon test and ask whether law enforcement officers "reasonably believed" that the warrant and supporting affidavits were sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause.1 5 When law enforcement officers are found to have reasonably relied on an invalid warrant, Koerth's substantial basis test mandates admission of the evidence uncovered under Leon's good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Koerth functions as a simple extension of Leon's central holding: Appellate courts should continue to admit evidence unless the defendant can show both that the warrant-issuing magistrate wholly abandoned the proper judicial role and that the reliance of law enforcement officers upon the defective search warrant was not objectively reasonable. 1 6 Crucially, by 12 . See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925 (1984) ("Indeed, it frequently will be difficult to determine whether the officers acted reasonably without resolving the Fourth Amendment issue. Even if the Fourth Amendment question is not one of broad import, reviewing courts could decide in particular cases that magistrates under their supervision need to be informed of their errors and so evaluate the officers' good faith only after finding a violation.").
13 These current approaches by appellate courts are problematic for at least two reasons. As a practical matter, allowing appellate courts broad discretion to proceed directly to good faith questions allows such courts to evade probable cause determinations in important or troubling cases. 22 Further, it is simply incorrect to say that probable cause determinations in good faith cases are not "logically necessary": 23 If law enforcement officers are not consistently informed about the fact-specific limits of probable cause, they cannot very well "harbor a good faith belief in its existence. ' 24 However difficult it may be for appellate judges to criticize the findings of warrant-issuing judges and magistrates, it is unwise and unfair to limit criticism in probable cause cases to the actions of law enforcement. Current doctrine requires law enforcement officers to bear responsibility for decisions that they do not make and for which they are not trained. Empirical evidence on the educative effects of the exclusionary rule upon law enforcement officers is scant, but there is reason to believe that those officers involved in exclusionary rule cases "learn most about changes in the law of search and seizure" from case-specific court experiences. 2 formulated by Cardozo over half a century ago, and argue that even Koerth's modest procedural reform increases the likelihood that guilty defendants will go free because of highly technical errors committed by well-intentioned magistrates and law enforcement officers. Second, one might contend that adopting Koerth's substantial basis test will impose needless costs on overworked appellate courts. Third, one might argue that Koerth is fundamentally incompatible with the letter or spirit of the Supreme Court's prior exclusionary rule jurisprudence. The remainder of this Comment answers these potential objections.
First, it is important to stress that Koerth need not alter the deferential standard of review that appellate courts apply to the decisions of warrantissuing judges and magistrates. Like Leon, Koerth continues to require that evidence obtained during a questionable search be admitted, under the objectively reasonable good faith exception, even if the appellate court finds that the warrant-issuing judge's decision on the issue of probable cause was erroneous. 28 In other words, Koerth's substantial basis test continues to protect the effects of difficult decisions made by warrant-issuing judges and magistrates, while allowing appellate courts to create instructive precedent to guide similar decisions in the future. Koerth's impact will thus likely be confined to clarifying post-Leon exclusionary rule doctrine for judicial officers issuing warrants.
Second, Koerth's substantial basis test might impose slight additional decision costs upon appellate courts, but these trivial costs should not prevent Koerth's much-needed procedural reforms. Adoption of Koerth's substantial basis test would cut off the presumption/assumption shortcut that some courts apply to probable cause determinations in good faith cases. 29 For such courts, adopting Koerth's test might well impose additional time and costs. But these burdens will only be significant in cases where the probable cause ruling represents a difficult or novel question of law. These are exactly the shots that appellate courts should be calling; they should not be allowed to assume away these important decisions. In cases where the presence or absence of probable cause is truly uncertain on appellate review, Koerth's substantial basis test only requires appellate courts to briefly confront and admit the causes of their uncertainty before proceeding to the good faith determination.
Finally, Koerth's reforms do not represent a significant break with Leon or other Supreme Court exclusionary rule precedent. As stated above, 37 But this shift did not create a blanket dispensation to prohibit review of the decisions of judicial officers who issue search warrants. Only a year before Leon, in Illinois v. Gates, the Court held that "[i]n order to ensure that.., an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued. 38 In the absence of an insupportably selective reading both of Leon and of prior Supreme Court holdings, Koerth's substantial basis test conforms to the full sweep of the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule jurisprudence.
IV
Current doctrine and important public policy considerations demonstrate that appellate courts "owe a duty to define the boundaries of probable cause, so that affiants. . , issuing magistrates, reviewing courts, and the executing officers on whose good faith we rely may have appropriate guidance. And these boundaries are best set, not by abstract statements, but by case-by-case decisions in real situations., 39 Today this obligation often goes unmet. Adoption of Koerth's substantial basis test would allow appellate courts to consistently exercise their duty to define and preserve Fourth Amendment protections.
-Zack Bray
